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Note
Going from Bad to Good: Combating
Corporate Corruption on World Bank-Funded
Infrastructure Projects
Courtney Hostetlert
Large-scale infrastructure projects are a vital part of the World Bank's
development agenda, but the World Bank and host countries alike have
placed little emphasis on combating corruption attached to these projects.
Investigation of ongoing corruption and punishment of offenders is an
important end goal in itself, and can be an important deterrent to future
corruption. The World Bank and host countries face challenges in
properly pursuing investigation and punishment, but the results
certainly are worth the effort. This Note explores the importance of
investigating and punishing corporate corruption on World Bank-funded
large-scale infrastructure projects, and presents practical suggestions as
to how investigation and punishment processes might be made more
effective. Specifically, host countries and the World Bank should utilize a
"trigger" mechanism, by which investigations by one party automatically
trigger investigations by the other, in order to increase accountability.
Other factors - including the willingness of third party states to assist in
these efforts - also influence the outcome, but the triggering mechanism
may be an important step forward. The outcome of the Lesotho
Highlands Water Project corruption investigations provides a useful
illustration of how such a cooperative triggering mechanism might work.
INTRODUCTION
The World Bank has identified corruption as one of the "greatest
obstacles to economic and social development."' In response, it has
t 2011 J.D. candidate, Yale Law School. With thanks to Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman for
her valuable advice, and to Matthew Matera and Romy Ganschow for their assistance and
edits.
1. Overview of Anticorruption Continued, WORLD BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/K6AEEPROCO (last visited Jan. 27, 2011); see also Combating
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developed extensive, aggressive anti-corruption campaigns and offered
financial support to good governance programs aimed at reducing
corruption in loan-recipient countries. Yet corruption remains an obstacle
even to the disbursement of Bank aid; Jeffrey Winters estimates that
"[s]ince its founding, the World Bank has participated mostly passively in
the corruption of roughly $100 billion of its loan funds intended for
development." 2  These funds usually are transferred to developing
countries via loans, which place the burden of repayment on future
generations who will have to pay the entire principal and accrued interest
despite having initially received only seventy cents on the dollar for these
loans.3
These figures take into account all types of corruption, most notably the
direct looting of loan monies by government officials. Winters cautions that
corporate corruption - usually in the form of bribes to government officials
in order to circumvent neutral bidding processes - makes up only a minor
percentage of the estimate.4 Yet these statistics mask the gravity of
entrenched corporate corruption on large-scale infrastructure projects in
developing countries. These projects have the potential to assist countries
in meeting their development goals by increasing revenue and fulfilling the
economic and social needs of their most impoverished communities, 5 but
they also act as lightning rods for corruption, environmental degradation,
and human rights violations against the communities that the projects are
intended to benefit. 6  Corruption exacerbates the problems of
environmental degradation and human rights violations.7
Dealing with these challenges is vital, as infrastructure projects have
been important to the World Bank's development strategies, and likely will
remain so in the future. In 2009, Robert Zoellick, President of the Bank,
pledged to increase Bank lending to infrastructure to $45 billion over the
next three years, citing such projects' ability to "create jobs as well as build
a foundation for long-term economic growth." 8 This pledge will increase
Corruption in the Multilateral Development Banks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
108th Cong. 1-2 (2004) (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar, Chairman, S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations).
2. Jeffrey A. Winters, Criminal Debt, in REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK 101, 101 (Jonathan
R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002).
3. Combating Corruption in Multilateral Development Banks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On
Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 25, 28 (2004) (statement of Jeffrey A. Winters, Associate
Professor, Northwestern University) [hereinafter Winters Statement].
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2009 21 (2009).
6. See George Ledec & Juan David Quintero, Good Dams and Bad Dams: Environmental
Criteria for Site Selection of Hydroelectric Projects 1 (World Bank, Sustainable Development
Working Paper No. 16, 2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
LACEXT/ Resources/258553-1123250606139/Good andBadDamsWP16.pdf.
7. See, e g., Wangari Maathai, Foreword: Water in the Community: Why Integrity Matters, in
GLOBAL CORRUPrION REPORT 2008: COiRRFON IN THE WATER SECTOR xix, xix (2008).
8. WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 2. This spending far outstrips spending on good
governance. See id. at 25.
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World Bank spending on infrastructure development by $15 billion when
compared to the $30 billion it spent from 2006-2009.9 The Joint
International Financial Institutions/Development Finance Institutions
Action Plan for Africa named "increasing lending to infrastructure
projects" a primary objective for financial assistance to the region.' 0 The
World Bank seeks to increase aid flow to infrastructure projects despite the
economic downturn, and considers infrastructure projects to be a crucial
source of jobs in the short-term of the financial crisis and a means by which
countries might recover." Furthermore, the World Bank's influence over
infrastructure development is compounded because even its minimal
financial or technical support may signal to other potential financiers that
the project is a legitimate and profitable investment.12
The ability of the World Bank, donor countries, and recipient countries
to limit corruption on these projects will greatly influence the effectiveness
of infrastructure spending. Although prevention programs are important,
this Note argues that post-corruption investigation, prosecution, and
punishment mechanisms are also critical to the successful deterrence of
corrupt practices in Bank-funded procurement projects. The World Bank
has developed investigation, prosecution, and punishment protocols, but
has not utilized them effectively or consistently. The question remains
whether the World Bank is capable of implementing them and willing to do
so. In order to answer this question, this Note examines two hydroelectric
dam projects: the Yacyretai Dam in Argentina and Paraguay and the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) in Lesotho and South Africa.
Both received World Bank funding, and both have been criticized for high
levels of corruption. Yet while no corporation was prosecuted in relation to
the Yacyretai Dam, the World Bank ultimately sanctioned two multi-
national corporations (MNCs) that received LHWP contracts after Lesotho
successfully prosecuted the responsible government official and
corporations.
The Lesotho example forms the basis for my central proposal as to how
to improve the investigation and punishment of corporate corruption on
World Bank projects. The World Bank has been greatly criticized for its
initial refusal to investigate MNCs involved in the LHWP,13 and
commentators have thus far used the LHWP scandal to demonstrate the
weaknesses in both the borrowing government and World Bank
approaches to corruption punishment and deterrence.14 While these points
9. WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 16.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id. at 2, 16, 21.
12. See, e.g., Korinna Horta, The World Bank's Decade for Africa: A New Dawn for Development
Aid?, 1YALEJ. INT'L AFF.4,15 (2005).
13. See, e.g., Lori Pottinger, Lesotho Highlands Water Project: What Went Wrong?, Presented at
Chatham House Conference "Corruption in Southern Africa: Sources and Solutions" (July 10,
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are valid, I argue that from this scandal may emerge a new "best practice"
for investigating, prosecuting, and punishing firms guilty of bribery and
fraud on Bank-funded infrastructure development projects.
Substantial changes must be made if the World Bank is to effectively
combat corporate corruption and overcome institutional inertia in its
infrastructure projects. In this Note, I offer a proposal for change that, if
implemented, may improve the efficacy of corporate sanctioning processes
in the World Bank and in domestic legal institutions. The proposed plan is
three-pronged. First, I argue that the World Bank Sanctions Committee
should introduce a trigger clause into its procedures. Under its terms,
when either the borrower state or the Sanctions Committee opens a
corruption investigation pertaining to the Bank-funded project, the other
party must also open or re-open its own investigation into the alleged
corruption. The Bank and the borrower state should either refuse to award
contracts to corporations under investigation for bribery or fraud, or make
awards contingent upon the corporation being found innocent of the
charges. The second element of my proposal for change will require the
borrower state and World Bank investigators to share information learned
from the investigation. Third, the World Bank will establish a support fund
for borrower governments that need monetary assistance to pursue
corruption investigations and prosecutions.
These elements are aimed at lessening - if they cannot altogether
alleviate - the problem of lack of will. A constant threat to this approach's
success is global willingness to sanction corporate corruption; however, I
argue that even assuming imperfect willingness, this combined approach is
far more likely to decrease corporate corruption than an approach that
utilizes only administrative sanctions or criminal prosecutions.
The Note proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I provide reasons why it is
important to focus on corporate corruption. I also explore why
investigation and punishment are crucial components of comprehensive
anti-corruption strategies. In Part II, I compare the YacyretA Dam with the
LHWP and place them both in the context of other large-scale infrastructure
development projects. I then review the details of the LHWP scandal and
identify explanations as to why the World Bank took action against
corporations involved in the LHWP but has not investigated the YacyretA
Hydroelectric Project corruption allegations. I ultimately conclude that the
willingness of domestic jurisdictions to investigate and prosecute offending
MNCs is the most important of these variables. In Part III, I review the
merits and weaknesses of the domestic hard law approach to the issue, and
the merits and weaknesses of the World Bank's administrative remedy
approach. In Part IV, I examine the merits and weaknesses of using a
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I. INVESIGATING CORPORATE CORRUirlON ON LARGE-SCALE
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS: PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE
A. Targeting Corporate Corruption in Infrastructure Projects
In the mid-1990s, the World Bank adopted a comprehensive anti-
corruption strategy that consists of five pillars, the first of which is to
"prevent[] fraud and corruption within World Bank projects."15 The Bank
continues to fall short of meeting this goal for three reasons. First, World
Bank staffers often prioritize the organization's anti-corruption agenda
below infrastructure project completion.16 World Bank officers feel "a
pressure to lend" in the World Bank's results-focused approach to aid.'7 As
one senior official explained, "'[w]e look more than anything else at what
the project achieves. . . We look, for instance, at whether schools get built,
not how the money was spent to build them."' 18 The World Bank
governance structure may further contribute to this "culture of loan
approval."' 9 As a result, the World Bank may be likely to accept some
corruption as a cost of development. Second, the World Bank has
traditionally focused its anti-corruption efforts on institutional structures.20
Third, when the Bank does combat corruption on its development projects,
it tends to focus its energies on government officials - who represent the
institution - and not the corporations who supply the bribes. 21
15. MARIO A. AGUILAR ET AL., WORLD BANK, PREVENTING FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN
WORLD BANK PROJECTS: A GUIDE FOR STAFF 2 (2000).
16. Parthapratim Chanda, The Effectiveness of the World Bank's Anti-Corruption Efforts:
Current Legal and Structural Obstacles and Uncertainties, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 315, 347
(2004) (noting that Bank staff may perceive corrupt development projects as an acceptable
"second-best" and favorable to cancelling the projects entirely).
17. Winters Statement, supra note 3, at 28.
18. Winters, supra note 2, at 111 (quoting World Bank senior official Katharine Marshall).
19. Chanda, supra note 16, at 342-343.
20. Tara Polzer, Corruption: Deconstructing the World Bank Discourse 20 (London Sch. of
Econ. Dev. Stud. Inst., Working Paper Series No. 01-18, 2001), available at
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP18.pdf.
21. For example, the World Bank's first published guidelines stated that if consultants are
granted contracts through methods of misprocurement, the World Bank may revoke the
funding promised to the borrower, but the guidelines did not identify punishments for the
contracting company or consultant. Only in recent revisions have they incorporated anti-
corruption language that targets the companies, as well. WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES:
SELECTION AND EMPLOYMENT OF CONSULTANTS BY WORLD BANK BORROWERS, §§ 1.17, 1.22
(2006 rev.) [hereinafter CONSULTANT GUIDELINES]; WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT
UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA CREDIT, §§ 1.12, 1.14 (2006 rev.) [hereinafter PROCUREMENT
GUIDELINES]; see also WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUFTION: THE ROLE OF
THE WORLD BANK 30, 32-33 (1997) (identifying modifications made to the Procurement and
Consultant Guidelines in 1996 and 1997, respectively, to punish bidders that have engaged in
fraud or corruption); Frank Vogl, The Supply Side of Global Bribery, 35 FIN. & DEv. (1998),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/06/vogl.htm (discussing
efforts to target both sides of corruption in international financial institutions). The
Procurement and Consultant Guidelines were each revised in 2011. The relevant language
pertaining to miisprocurement, fraud, and corruption remain substantially similar. The 2011
versions of the Procurement and Consultant Guidelines broaden the definition of agent to
ensure that companies cannot engage in bribery using unofficial agents; explicitly state that a
sanctioned firm or individual may not be hired as a subcontractor on a Bank-financed contract;
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Certainly the costs of corporate corruption are minimal relative to the
costs of grand, or "high-level," 22 corruption.23  However, anti-corruption
programs that focus solely on grand corruption risk overlooking the ways
in which corporate corruption feeds into grand corruption. They also
overlook the ways in which corporate corruption can cripple long-term
development.24 Once these relationships are taken into account, a new
picture emerges - one in which corruption on development projects and the
problem of bribe-offering companies moves into the foreground.
MNCs play an active role in subverting the development process, using
bribes and fraud to circumvent bidding processes and operating
regulations. This hinders the World Bank's anti-corruption and economic
development agendas in three ways. First, corruption negatively influences
a country's economic productivity,25 the stability of its political institutions
and democracy, 26 and its social development. 27 Second, corruption on
large-scale infrastructure projects also creates an environment of impunity
that may instill a public conception that corruption is acceptable. As Susan
Rose-Ackerman has noted, "a policy of active tolerance [for bribery] will
undermine the prospects for long-term reform" and "delegitimize
government in the eyes of its citizens."28 Finally, corrupt deals made to win
infrastructure development projects skew government spending and
development agendas; such deals encourage officials to seek aid money for
and state that these provisions apply when a U.N. agency provides technical assistance to, or
otherwise supports, a project. WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: SELECION AND EMPLOYMENT OF
CONSULTANTS UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA CREDITS & GRANTS BY WORLD BANK BORROWERS
§§ 1.19, 1.23 (2011 rev.); WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT OF GOODS, WORKS, AND
NON-CONSULTING SERVICES UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA CREDITS & GRANTS BY WORLD BANK
BORROWERS §§ 1.14, 1.16 (2011 rev.). The 2006 versions of the Procurement Guidelines and the
Consultant Guidelines were in place when the World Bank conducted its second investigation
into the LHWP, and therefore this Note relies on the content of that version of the Guidelines.
22. Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Grand" Corruption and the Ethics of Global Business, 26 J. OF
BANKING & FIN. 1889, 1889 (2002); see also Adam Graycar, Corruption, in INTERNATIONAL CRIME
AND JUSTICE 215, 216 (Mangai Natarajan ed., 2011).
23. Winters Statement, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that corporate corruption is minimal
compared to the criminal debt that arises in the relationship between development banks and
borrowing governments); Combating Corruption in Multilateral Development Banks: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 32, 36 (2004) (statement of Manish Bapna,
Executive Director, Bank Information Center) [hereinafter Bapna Statement] ("[The most
systemic corruption is the pervasive, across the board corruption embedded in
governments.").
24. John Brademas & Fritz Heimann, Tackling International Corruption: No Longer Taboo, 77
FOREIGN AFF. 17, 18 (1998).
25. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND REFORM 3 (1999); Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts:
An Analytic Framework, 20 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 239, 240 (2000); Daniel Lederman et al.,
Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter, 17 ECON. & POL. 1, 1 (2005).
26. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, pmbl., U.N.
GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003).
27. See, e.g., Daniel Kaufman et al., Governance Matters 1 (World Bank Policy Research
Policy Working Paper No. 2196, 1999) (finding that good governance may result in lower
infant mortality and higher literacy rates).
28. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 17.
236 [Vol. 14
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projects that promise profits in the form of bribes and kick-backs, rather
than for projects that are more beneficial but less profitable for the
officials. 29
Scholars already have eloquently articulated the economic, political,
and social ramifications of corruption.3 0 It is sufficient here to focus on the
fact that corporations that engage in corrupt practices exacerbate
corruption's overall negative consequences for development. Corporate
corruption increases the cost of development projects, leaving a greater
burden of repayment on the impoverished communities in borrowing
countries. 3 ' A worst-case scenario is provided by the extreme example of
the Bataan nuclear plant in the Philippines, constructed in the early 1970s.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation allegedly gave President Ferdinand
Marcos $80 million in kickbacks on a project that ultimately cost $2.3
billion, far more than the cost of a similar plant in South Korea. Taxpayers
will be financing the debt until 2018, although the plant was never put into
operation.32 In addition, even those projects that become fully efficient and
profitable upon completion may not be able to generate enough profit to
cover loans made more expensive because corporate corruption increased
the cost of construction. The state also will have fewer resources to
dedicate to infrastructure maintenance or new project development.33
Either way, taxpayers bear the costs without seeing commensurate
returns.34
Corruption also vastly decreases the likelihood that a project will be
successful. At best, corporations that land lucrative contracts as a result of
bribery and fraud do so at the expense of superior competitors whose
proposals would have better met the qualifications of the project. These
corporations also are not bound by bidding requirements or operational
duties, and have more incentive to cut corners.35 As one World Bank task
manager noted:
29. See Brinkerhoff, supra note 25, at 240; Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption,
108 Q. J. ECON. 599, 614-15 (1993); Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, Corruption, Public Investment,
and Growth, in THE WELFARE STATE, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, AND GROWTH: SELECTED PAPERS FROM
THE 53RD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC FINANCE 41, 42 (Hirofumi
Shibata & Toshihiro Ihori eds., 1999); Charles Kenny, Measuring and Reducing the Impact of
Corruption in Infrastructure 18 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4099, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=952071; THE CORNER HOUSE,
EXPORTING CORRUPTION: PRIVATISATION, MULTINATIONALS AND BRIBERY 3 (Briefing No. 19,
2000); WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
DECISION-MAKING 187 (2000).
30. See, e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 25; Brademas & Heimann, supra note 24; Ben W.
Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, 85(3) FOREIGN AFF. 75, 76
(2006); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 29.
31. Winters Statement, supra note 3 at 25, 28; Bapna Statement, supra note 23, at 35.
32. THE CORNER HOUSE, supra note 29, at 6.
33. Tanzi & Davoodi, supra note 29, at 47.
34. Kenny, supra note 29, at 4.
35. See Tanzi & Davoodi, supra note 29, at 45; Kenny, supra note 29, at 17-18.
2011] 237
7
Hostetler: Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption on World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT Li. [
You cut corners and nobody cares. If you let out a contract for $2
million, and you get the few civil servants at the top sharing
$600,000 or 30 percent, do they care if the contractor puts in
concrete that is just sand and water? Do they care if the contractor
doesn't put reinforcing steel in the structures? They don't care. So
when Bank people say we're at least getting 70 cents of good
development on the dollar, no you don't. Because the contractor
either has to make back the money that he's kicked back, or he just
figures, "hey, it's open season, I do what I want and no one is going
to challenge me." And so you have this feeding frenzy, and the end
result is you get very little development. 36
A lack of corporate accountability may contribute to project delays,
postponing development benefits and increasing the number of years over
which loan interest accrues. It may also lead to inefficiency and shoddier
workmanship.37 Dam projects, for example, require careful feasibility
studies, design, and engineering. Mistakes during construction may
require costly repairs and limit the dam's operational capacity.38 The
inferior projects then require maintenance that would not otherwise have
been needed.39 Yet as previously noted, the upfront costs of the corrupted
project means that the state may not have the resources to pay for these
repairs, 40 further jeopardizing development.
Corporations that were awarded dams due to corrupt dealings may not
be as capable of meeting environmental standards as other firms, as bribe-
receiving public officials likely will not hold the corporations to the
mandated environmental standards or human rights regulations that
World Bank contracts require. Many projects are complex and require
careful planning to avoid an overly negative environmental impact - dams
in particular often require massive community displacements - and
environmental degradation and human rights abuses become more likely
when the lead construction corporations and consultants are not bound by
the standards meant to mitigate these damages.41
These dire consequences are made even more problematic by the high
probability of corporate corruption on development projects. MNCs pay
approximately $80 billion per year in bribes42 in an attempt to gain access to
36. Winters, supra note 2, at 120 (quoting a World Bank task manager).
37. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff, supra note 25, at 240; Kenny, supra note 29, at 17-18; Tanzi &
Davoodi, supra note 29, at 46.
38. WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, supra note 29, at 37-38.
39. Tanzi & Davoodi, supra note 29, at 45-46.
40. See supra text accompanying note 33.
41. See, e.g., Winters, supra note 2, at 120-21 (quoting a World Bank task manager); Thayer
Scudder, Hydropower Corruption and the Politics of Resettlement, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2008 96, 97 (2008) ("Engineering and other firms have reneged on promises or otherwise
cheated resettlers, as with India's Maheshwar Dam.").
42. THE CORNER HOUSE, supra note 29, at 2. Although this is a small amount relative to the
$1 trillion that the World Bank Institute estimates to be the total amount of money paid in
238 Vol. 14
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lucrative infrastructure development work that is an important component
of economic development agendas.43 In 2004, the Engineering News
Record estimated that the top twenty-five firms in the field performed work
worth $98 billion annually.44 There is a high incentive to win these
contracts, and Transparency International's Bribe Payer's Index reveals that
MNCs working in "public work contracts and construction" are perceived
to be the most corrupt across two variables. They are the most likely to
bribe government officials, and the most likely to engage in "state capture,"
or the "exert[ion of] undue influence on the policy process using financial
or other means." 45 MNCs, therefore, are a part of the corruption narrative
that hinders vital projects and saddles already-impoverished people with
extra debt.
Finally, there are fewer companies capable of supplying bribes in order
to get large-scale infrastructure project contracts than there are potential
bribe-receiving government officials, 46 and these "'[m]ultinational firms are
central actors in many large-scale corrupt deals."47 These corporations
"approximate . . . rational economic actor[s]." 48  Therefore, it is more
efficient to target these few companies than the potential bribe-receivers
who are more difficult to identify or predict.4 9 For these reasons, although
the problem traditionally has been defined in terms of the demand side of
bribes, and the attention has been given to the bribe-receivers, 50 an effective
solution must consider both the supply and demand sides of corruption.5 1
B. The Importance of Investigation and Punishment
Corporate corruption on infrastructure projects obstructs anti-
corruption and development agendas.5 2 Any solution to this problem must
involve post-corruption investigation and punishment. Ben Heineman and
Fritz Heimann have identified four measures required to tackle corruption.
bribes annually, it is substantial in absolute terms. As one practitioner noted, it is roughly the
amount that the United Nations believes is required to eradicate global poverty. See The Costs
of Corruption, WORLD BANK (Apr. 8, 2004), http://go.worldbank.org/LJA29GHA80 (last
visited June 23, 2011).
43. WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
44. Ashwin Mahalingam et al., Cultural Clashes in International Infrastructure Development
Projects: Which Cultures Matter?, International Symposium on Procurement Systems: The
Impact of Cultural Differences and Systems on Construction Performance 2 (Las Vegas, NV,
Feb. 2005) (citing ENGINEERING NEWS RECORD SOURCEBOOK 2004).
45. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX 2008 10-11 (2008), available at
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/39275/622457.
46. See KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 129 (1997).
47. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 185.
48. William W. Bratton, Never Trust a Corporation, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 867,870 (2002).
49. See, e.g., Jeff Huther & Anwar Shah, Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework
for Evaluation 8 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2501, 2000) (identifying
various reasons that individuals may be motivated to accept bribes).
50. Vogl, supra note 21.
51. ELLIOr, supra note 46, at 148.
52. See supra Part I.A.
2011] 239
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Three are preventative: prevention via legislation and regulations,
prevention via long-term state building and institutional reform, and
prevention via norm and value changes. The fourth is enforcement "to
deter future misconduct by investigating and prosecuting existing
corruption."53 Prevention policies are less effective when they do not
include such enforcement mechanisms, particularly when corruption is
entrenched in a sector, country, or corporate culture.
Punishing project-based corruption can serve as a stop-gap measure in
place of long-term prevention policies.54 It takes time to implement anti-
corruption regulations and oversight, and even longer to change a
corporation or country's culture with regard to corruption. Once in place,
preventative measures still must compete with the financial incentives of
corruption. "A foreign company's quickest route to maximizing profits in
developing and transitional nations may indeed be bribery of a public
official. . . the potential for huge profits makes the violation of the law seem
worth the risk of punishment."55 When the investigations and punishments
are sufficiently costly to the firm, they can be effective deterrence
mechanisms that quickly change the firm's cost-benefit calculus. 56
However, if the institutions capable of conducting investigations into and
punishing corrupt behavior opt not to do so, it sends a strong signal to
corporations that bribery is acceptable. This undermines efforts to instill
new norms or otherwise eradicate corruption. Preventative measures are
therefore weakened when investigation and punishment mechanisms are
lacking.
Practically, fining corporations may also enable the World Bank or the
borrowing country to recoup financial losses suffered due to corruption.
Sanctions may help the World Bank and borrowing countries choose non-
corrupt bidding companies for future contracts. Fines and sanctions also
limit a corporation's ability to financially benefit from corrupt deals.
H. RESPONDING TO CORRUPTION: CASE STUDY OF THE YACYRETA
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT AND LHWP
The World Bank has determined that hydroelectric dam projects are
valuable to achieving development goals. "Since its founding, the Bank has
supported more than 550 dams around the globe, with over US$90 billion ...
in loans and guarantees." 57 Approximately $30-45 billion is spent on large
53. Heineman & Heimann, supra note 30, at 77.
54. See THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK 25 (1997).
55. Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition ofIndustrialized Nations,
Developing Nations, Multilateral Development Banks, and Non-Governmental Organizations: A
Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 33 CORNE LL INT' L L. J. 547, 557 (2000).
56. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption, in READINGS IN PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONSTITUITIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 551, 553 (C.K. Rowley & F.G. Schneider eds., 2008).
57. INT'L RIVER NETWORK, THE WORLD BANK'S BIG DAM LEGACY 1 (2007).
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dam projects annually.58 Yet these projects are not without controversy.
Although they promise to generate much-needed revenue for the host country
and electricity for impoverished or industrializing communities, in practice
dams also result in massive human displacement, substantial changes to the
environment, and sometimes severe environmental degradation and human
rights abuses.59 Dam projects are also vulnerable to corrupt practices by
government officials and contracting corporations. 60 In order to determine
what factors contribute to the successful investigation and punishment of
corrupt actors involved in World Bank projects, this section examines two
dam projects plagued by corruption scandals that afflict many large-scale
infrastructure projects.
A. The YacyretA Hydroelectric Project
The Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project is a joint venture between Argentina
and Paraguay, administered by a bilateral institution, the Entidad
Binacional YacyretA (EBY).6l The two countries signed a treaty in 1973, and
construction on the dam began ten years later, in 1983.62 YacyretA is a
complex project to construct dams along sixty-seven kilometers of the
Parana River, which forms the border between the signatory countries.
Paraguay was to bear the bulk of the environmental and social costs of the
project, while Argentina would consume the large majority of the electricity
produced and pay revenue to Paraguay for that electricity. Initial estimates
suggested a final cost of $1.35 billion, although the budget subsequently
expanded to $5.3 billion. 63 The actual costs far exceeded the initial budgets;
final costs reached approximately $11.5 billion.r The World Bank initially
contributed $460 million in loans.65 By the project's end, the World Bank
had lent $895 million to the project, and the Inter-American Development
Bank lent an additional $840 million.66 The project also experienced
extreme delays. Construction began in 1983; as of 1991, the project was
only 85% complete and running nine years behind schedule. 67 Although
58. Chris Hails, Global Water Crisis, in 3 U.N. ENV. PROGRAMME, FINANCING DAMS AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 34 (2004).
59. See THAYER SCUDDER, THE FUTURE OF LARGE DAMS 1 (2005).
60. Id. at 2; see also Janelle Plummer, Water and Corruption: A Destructive Partnership, in
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 3, 9 (2008) (table identifying the types of corruption that emerge
in water-related construction projects).
61. Kay Treakle & Elias Diaz Pefia, Accountability at the World Bank: What Does it Take?
Lessons from the Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project, Argentina/Paraguay, in DEMANDING
ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 69,70 (Dana
Clark, Jonathan Fox & Kay Treakle eds., 2003).
62. Treakle & Diaz Pefia, supra note 61, at 70.
63. Id.; Hails, supra note 58, at 35.
64. Hails, supra note 58, at 35.
65. SAROJ KUMAR PAL, LEXIcoN ON GEOGRAPHY OF DEVELOPMENT 231 (2005)
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the project began generating initial electricity in 1994,68 the final turbine did
not become operative until 1998.69 As of 2006, it was operating at only 60%
capacity and required additional work - 1,167 building projects over four
years, costing an additional $563 million - to reach full capacity.70
Yacyret6 also has been "fraught with corruption scandals [and] gross
mismanagement" as well as construction delays and cost overruns,7 t
largely caused by corruption. In 1990, Argentine President Carlos Menem
described the project as "a monument to corruption." 72 Evidence suggests
that contracting firms won lucrative contracts through corrupt practices.
The first "complete technical and economic feasibility study" was
conducted in 1971 by Harza y Asociados, a consortium that included Harza
Engineering (USA), Lahmeyer International Gmbh (Germany), Analisis y
Desarrollo Economico S.A. (Argentina), Yacyretl S.A. (Paraguay), and
Cuyum S.A.T.C. (Argentina).73 The same consortium, renamed Harza y
Consorciados, Consultores Internacionales de YacyretA (CIDY) and
reformulated to include Harza as the lead firm, Lahmeyer as its partner, a
group of six Argentine engineering firms, and a group of six Paraguayan
engineering firms, was again hired to prepare the final design and to
supply the technical supervision of the project's execution. 74 The contract
was renewed in 1986; the ten-year contract netted the consortium an
additional $132 million.75 CIDY won the design and oversight consultancy
bid even though its feasibility study was not satisfactory and it did not
achieve the highest score in the bidding process. 76 CIDY's contract has been
renewed most recently in 2002.77 Experts in Argentina denounced this
latest contract as inefficient.78
The $1 billion construction contract was granted to ERYDAY, an ad hoc
and complex consortium comprised of the two final bidding consortiums:
one group of thirteen firms led by Impregilo (Italy) and another group of
nineteen firms led by Dumez (France), with Impregilo leading the whole. 79
The bidding process took seven years. Both final bidders were linked with
political lobby groups in Paraguay and Argentina, and each accused the
other of corruption.80
In 2003, EBY renewed its health insurance policy with British Insurer
68. Id. at 72.
69. Juan Pablo Conti, The Ten Billion Dollar Dam, POWER ENGINEER, Feb./Mar. 2006 at 23,
24.
70. Id. at 26.
71. Treakle & Diaz Pefia, supra note 61, at 70.
72. PAL, supra note 65, at 231; Hails, supra note 58, at 35.
73. GUISAVO LINS RIBEIRO, TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND HYDROPOLITICS IN
ARGENTINA: THE YACRETA HIGH DAM 35-36 (1994).
74. Id. at 37.
75. Id. at 38.
76. Id. at 36-37.
77. Conti, supra note b9, at 25.
78. Id.
79. RIBEIRO, supra note 73, at 39.
80. Id. at 38-39.
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Health. There is evidence that the contract was made without a public
bidding process and was overpriced by approximately $1.5 billion per
year.81 It also appears that $17 million was "unduly paid to Italian
generator supplier Ansaldo."82 The borrowing states have brought a
lawsuit to recover this money. ERYDAY has filed its own lawsuit against
EBY for $1.5 billion, arising from a dispute over the price paid for workers'
lunches.83
Although the Yacyreta Dam was brought before the World Bank
Inspection Panel, the panel's investigation focused on the environmental
and social failures of the project, not the financial corruption nor the
connection between financial corruption and the environmental and social
failures that followed. 84  Despite President Menem's declaration, no
substantive investigations or prosecutions appear to have been carried out
by either country, any third-party country, or by the World Bank or Inter-
American Development Bank.85
B. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project
The LHWP is a multi-billion dollar civil engineering project agreed to
by the governments of Lesotho and South Africa and administered by the
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA), a special Lesotho
government agency specifically tasked with oversight of the project.
Through the construction of five hydroelectric dams and a series of tunnels
and pumping stations, the project was designed to control the flow of the
Senqu and Orange Rivers in order to provide water for South Africa's
industrial Gauteng province.86 The project was intended to provide
Lesotho with much-needed electric power, and with revenue from the
export of water to South Africa.8 7 Lesotho is a small state that ranks 141st
on the Human Development Index and is considered to be a Least
Developed Country.8 8
81. Conti, supra note 69, at 25.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, REVIEW OF PROBLEMS AND ASSESSMENT OF ACTION
PLANS: ARGENTINA/PARAGUAY YACYRETA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (1997). Although the
Panel criticized the project for having insufficient financial resources to be properly completed,
see Treakle & Diaz Pefia, supra note 61, at 77, it did not investigate or remark on corruption
charges and remained focused on the environmental and social costs of the project. See
generally id. (discussing the Inspection Panel claim and investigation).
85. Yacyreti Dam, INT'L RIVERS NETWORK, http://www.intemationalrivers.org/en/latin-
america/ para guay-paran% C3% Al-basin/yacyret% C3% Al-dam (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
86. Horta, supra note 12, at 14-15; Fiona Darroch, The Lesotho Highlands Water Project:
Bribery on a Massive Scale (prepared for Transparency Int'l),
http://www.ipocafrica.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=71&Itemid=66
(last visited Jan. 9, 2011); Overview of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, LESOTHO HIGHLANDS
WATERK PROJICr, http://www.hwp.org.ls/overview/default.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter Project Overview].
87. Horta, supra note 12, at 15; Project Overview, supra note 86.
88. Human Development Report 2010: Lesotho, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME,
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Early feasibility surveys initially were conducted in the 1950s. 89
Lahmeyer International formed part of the consortium that carried out a
joint detailed feasibility study of the project between 1983 and 1986.90 The
governments of Lesotho and South Africa signed the Lesotho Highlands
Water Project Treaty on October 24, 1986,91 and the World Bank began
providing "critical support for the technical design of the project" the same
year.92 Further engineering studies were conducted in subsequent years,
and construction on the first phase of the project began in 1989.93 The
construction is taking place in several different places. As of 2010, Phase
1A - the construction of the Katse Dam and related work - and Phase 1B -
the construction of Mohale Dam and related work - have been completed.94
Work on the remaining dams is ongoing. The entire project is expected to
cost an estimated $8 billion. The World Bank provided over $110 million in
funding for project design and for Phase 1A construction, and coordinated
the financial program, which assisted Lesotho in securing additional
backers for the project.95
The LHWP was plagued by reports of environmental degradation,
human rights violations, mismanagement, and corruption. 96 Lesotho's
efforts to root out corruption on the project began in 1993, when military
rule in Lesotho ended and a newly elected government ordered an audit of
the LHDA. The audit revealed several types of corrupt activity by
government officials, including the LHDA's Chief Executive Officer,
Masupha Ephraim Sole. As chief executive of the LHDA, Sole had control
over the award of construction and consultancy contracts. It was in this
capacity that he received bribes, often via middlemen operating in or
around Lesotho. 97 The MNCs paid extravagant fees to their agents, made
conditional upon the company being awarded the contract; the agent, upon
receiving the fees, immediately transferred substantial portions of that fee
to Sole.98 Twelve firms ultimately were implicated in the bribery and fraud
schemes.99
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/LSO.htnd (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
89. Project Overview, supra note 86.
90. Id.
91. The Treaty, LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT,
http://www.1hwp.org.ls/overview/treaty.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
92. Horta, supra note 12, at 15.
93. Project Overview, supra note 86; A Brief History of Africa's Largest Water Project, INT'L
RIVERS NETWORK, http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/931 (last visited Mar. 1,
2010).
94. INT'L RIVERS NETWORK, supra note 93.
95. Horta, supra note 12, at 15; INT'L RIVERS NETWORK, supra note 93.
96. Pottinger, supra note 13.
97. A. Earle, The Role of Governance in Countering Corruption: An African Case Study, 9
WATER POL'Y 69, 76 (2007).
98. Id.
99. Lori Ann Wanlin, The Gap Between Promise and Practice in the Global Fight Against
Corruption, 6 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 209, 222 (2006); see also Pottinger, supra note 13
(identifying the twelve companies implicated in the bribery scandal).
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In 1996, the government of Lesotho initiated civil proceedings against
Sole and the investigation revealed financial transfers for which Sole
provided no explanation. Judgment was entered against Sole in 1999, a
decision upheld on appeal in 2001.100 Soon after the civil judgment was
rendered, the government of Lesotho initiated criminal proceedings against
Sole and eighteen corporations, consortia members, and individual
intermediaries. The court ordered that the defendants be tried separately,
and in 2001 the first criminal case against Sole began. 01 In consideration of
the sensitive nature of the trial, Lesotho brought Judge Brendan Cullinan,
an experienced and respected former chief justice of the country, out of
retirement for the LHWP corruption cases. 102 In 2002, Sole was convicted
on criminal charges of bribery and sentenced to eighteen years in prison for
accepting more than $6 million in bribes,10 3 which was shortened to fifteen
years on appeal.104 The decision by the government of Switzerland to grant
the prosecution access to Sole's Swiss bank accounts proved to be an
important aspect of the case,105 as this access provided irrefutable evidence
of corruption and implicated several firms.
Utilizing the information that emerged during early investigations of
LHDA corruption and during its prosecution of Sole, the Lesotho
government then criminally tried Acres International and Lahmeyer
International. 106 Acres International was convicted of bribery in 2002 and
ordered to pay a fine of C$3.8 million, reduced to C$2.6 million on
appeal.107 Lahmeyer International was convicted of bribery in 2003 and
ordered to pay a fine of C$2.2 million, increased to C$2.5 million on
appeal.108 Spie Batignolles,109 a French firm, and the Italian firm Impregilo
have both pled guilty to bribery and have been ordered to pay fines. 110
The World Bank initially opposed Lesotho's decision to remove Sole
from his position at the LHDA while its audit was ongoing because the
Bank was concerned that his removal "would interfere with project
construction timetables and could lead to costly overruns."' 1' In 2002, after
Sole had been convicted of bribery, the World Bank initiated investigations
into the behavior of Lahmeyer International and Acres, and cleared both
corporations of any wrongdoing. After Lesotho's successful prosecutions,
100. Darroch, supra note 86, at 1.
101. Id.
102. Wanlin, supra note 99, at 223.
103. Kristen Lewis & Roberto Lenton, Corruption and Water Resources Management: Threats
to Quality, Equitable Access and Environmental Sustainability, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2008 18,24 (2008)
104. Sole v. Crown (CRI/T/111/91) [2003] C. of A. (Apr. 14, 2003).
105. Wanlin, supra note 99, at 224.
106. THE CORNER HOUSE, DAMS INC. 2: LAHMEYER INTERNATIONAL (2003),
http://www.intemationalrivers.org/files/LahmeyerComerhouse.02.28.03.pdf.
107. Acres Int'l Ltd. v. Crown (CRI/T/144/02) [20031 C. of A. (Aug. 15, 2003).
108. Lahmeyer Int'l Gmbh v. Crown (CRI16) [2003] C. of A. (Mar. 26, 2004).
109. Spie Batignolles is now Schneider Electric S.A. Wanlin, supra note 99, at 223.
110. Wanlin, supra note 99, at 223.
111. Pottinger, supra note 13.
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however, the World Bank responded with more substantial investigations
into the involved corporations. In 2004 and 2006, the World Bank Sanctions
Committee temporarily debarred Acres International and Lahmeyer
International, respectively, for bribery and fraud in relation to their
contracts on the LHWP.112
C. Similar Histories, Different Consequences
Both the YacyretAi Hydroelectric Project and the LHWP have been
plagued by accusations of corruption, but in only the latter case did the
World Bank investigate these claims. Although a variety of factors
influenced the trajectory of the projects and corruption claims, the
willingness and ability of Lesotho to pursue domestic criminal claims was
an important impetus for the World Bank to conduct its own investigation.
The similarities between the two dams are striking. Both dam projects
were bilateral, and in each case the more impoverished country - Paraguay
and Lesotho, respectively - was to bear the environmental and social
burdens and reap the largest profit, while the relatively more developed
country - Argentina and South Africa, respectively - would reap the
benefits of increased resources (electricity and water) and pay revenue in
return. Both dam projects were conceived of and formalized via bilateral
treaties. At the time that the treaties were signed and construction began,
final authority and control over project financing rested with undemocratic
governments; Paraguay, Argentina, and Lesotho all were military
dictatorships,113 and the apartheid government controlled South Africa.
Despite these political concerns, the World Bank provided financial and
technical support for the projects and supported their development. 114
Indeed, it "provided critical support for the technical design" of LHWP in
1986, as international sanctions against South Africa's apartheid
government hindered the project's progress.115  The Bank's financial
support, though essential to the projects' success, was modest in
comparison to the projects' total costs, although the Bank did contribute a
much larger amount of funding to the YacyretA Hydroelectric Project than
it has thus far contributed to the LHWP. In 1996, the year that the World
112. Acres International, a private Canadian firm, was debarred in 2004 for a period of
three years, and Lahmeyer International, a private German firm, was debarred on November
3, 2006, for seven years. World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms: Fraud and Corruption, WORLD
BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=84266&contentMDK=
64069844&menuPK=116730&pagePK=64148989&piPK=64148984 (last visited Feb. 5, 2011); see
also Wanlin, supra note 99, at 227.
113. Cinnamon Carlarne & John Carlame, In-Credible Government: Legitimacy, Democracy,
and Non-Governmental Organizations, 6 PUB. ORG. REv. 347, 360 (2006).
114. This was in keeping with the World Bank's non-political, economics-based approach
to development aid at the time. Until the mid-1990s, "if there was an economic case for
lending to a corrupt and abusive regime, then the Bank was obligated to do so." HEATHER
MARQUETTE, CORRUFTION, POLITKcs AND DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK I
(2003).
115. Horta, supra note 12, at 15.
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Bank first developed a debarment process for corporations found to have
engaged in corrupt activities while bidding or working on World Bank
projects, construction on the Yacyret6 Hydroelectric Project and the LHWP
had been ongoing for fifteen years and nine years respectively.
In addition, there is overlap between the two dam projects with regard
to the MNCs that were hired as lead or partner firms in the consultancy and
contractor consortia. Lahmeyer International, Impregilio, and Dumez,
three firms that were prosecuted for corruption in Lesotho, have lucrative
contracts in the YacyretA Hydroelectric Project. 116 Regional similarities
emerge as well: the lead and partner firms on the major contracts on both
dams are MNCs based in North America or Europe.
There are significant differences between the two dams, however. For
example, although all four countries have transitioned to democracy since
the projects began, the governments have had remarkably different
responses to project corruption. While Lesotho's newly elected government
immediately initiated an audit of the project, neither Paraguay nor
Argentina have taken this type of active stance against corruption on the
YacretA Hydroelectric Project, and some evidence suggests that
corporations were able to cultivate suspect relationships with politicians in
order to win contracts on the project.1 17 In addition, LHDA controlled the
bidding process for LHWP contracts. Lesotho was able to focus its
investigation on a single bureaucrat without affecting members of the
newly elected government. The corrupt practices were more diffuse in
Paraguay and Argentina and involved legislators, making domestic
investigations more complex and less likely to occur at all. However, while
these differences may help explain the failure of Argentina and Paraguay to
initiate investigations, they do not adequately explain why the World Bank
failed to investigate the corruption on the YacyretA Hydroelectric Project.
It is possible that the World Bank's decision not to investigate or act
upon corporate corruption claims with regard to the Yacyreta Hydroelectric
Project rests upon variables not yet discussed. This Note cannot hope to
exhaust all the variables that distinguish YacyretA and LHWP; regional and
political differences are enormous. Nuanced bilateral relationships
between the borrower countries, the World Bank's donors, and the
corporations' home countries certainly may influence the World Bank's
response to allegations against the dams. However, these variables have
not completely prevented the World Bank from taking action with regard to
Yacreta; in 1996, the World Bank Independent Inspection Panel
recommended that the World Bank authorize a full investigation of the
dam project's environmental and resettlement policies.118  Therefore,
political variables alone cannot account for the World Bank's complacency
with regard to the financial corruption of the YacyretA but not the LHWP.
116. Pottinger, supra note 13.
117. See, e.g., RI BEIRO, supra note 73, at 37-38.
118. Treakle & Diaz Peila, supra note 61.
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That Lesotho was willing and had the means to pursue criminal charges
against the offending companies was clearly an important impetus for the
World Bank in reopening its own investigations.
III. EVALUATING THE OPTIONS
Allegations of corruption may be brought before the World Bank via its
Sanctions Board, or before the administrative or judicial mechanisms available
in the host country. In addition, third-party states, multilateral organizations,
and non-government actors have utilized their own formal and informal
investigatory and punishment methods. In this Part, I review each party's
methods and determine that none are singularly capable of investigating and
punishing large-scale infrastructure corruption within their respective
jurisdictions.
A. The World Bank Sanctions Board
The World Bank Sanctions Board governs the investigation and
punishment of corruption on World Bank infrastructure projects. The
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) and the Articles of Agreement of the International
Development Agency (IDA) provided the World Bank with an early
mandate against corruption. The IBRD Articles of Agreement requires that
"[t]he Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any
loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted." 119 The
IDA Articles place identical stipulations upon its financing.120 In 1995, the
World Bank revised and expanded its Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD
Loans and IDA Credits (Procurement Guidelines) and in 1997, it produced a
second set of guidelines for borrowers, Guidelines: Selection and Employment
of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers (Consultant Guidelines), both of
which included clauses regarding corruption. The Procurement Guidelines
stipulate that the World Bank will reject proposals of bidding corporations
that engage in "corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, or coercive practices," cancel
portions of a loan if the borrower engages in corrupt practices and fails to
take corrective measures, sanction firms that have engaged in corrupt
practices on a Bank-financed contract, and reserve the right to contractually
require firms to permit the Bank to inspect their accounts.121 Similar clauses
are included in the Consultant Guidelines.122
The World Bank developed a debarment process in 1996, and in 1998
119. INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEv. [IBRD], ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, art. 3, §
5(b) (as amended Feb. 16, 1989).
120. INT'L DEV. ASS'N [IDA], ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, art. 5, § 1(g) (1960).
121. PROCUREMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 1.14(b)-(e); see also WORLD BANK,
GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD) LOANS AND IDA CREDJITS, § 1 .15(b)-(e) (1995).
122. CONSULTANT GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 1.22(b)-(e); see also WORLD BANK,
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created a Sanctions Committee to review allegations and recommend
decisions to the World Bank President."23 In 2002, it engaged Richard
Thornburgh to evaluate the committee and recommend changes,124 many of
which it subsequently implemented.125 In 2007, the sanctioning process
began operating according to a new set of procedures, which were again
revised in 2010.126 The Bank adopted a two-tier sanctioning process
consisting of the Sanctions Board and Evaluation Officers.127 To initiate
procedures, the Integrity Vice Presidency of the World Bank (INT) submits
a Statement of Accusations and Evidence to the Evaluation Officer.128 If the
Evaluation Officer determines that the accusations are sufficiently
supported, INT will issue a Notice of Sanctions Proceedings to the
Respondent.129 The Respondent may contest the allegations by making a
written submission to the Sanctions Board, which will then hear and make
a ruling on the case.130 In the case of either conditional non-debarment or
debarment with conditional release, the INT appoints an Integrity
Compliance Officer to notify the parties of the conditions they must meet in
order to be released from or avoid debarment, and to monitor compliance
with any sanctions.' 3 ' The INT may temporarily debar a company during
the INT's investigation or pending the outcome of the hearing.132
The World Bank has the ability to sanction firms for engaging in
corrupt behavior on any Bank-funded project, regardless of whether the
firm's contract involved a part of the project funded by the World Bank.133
If the World Bank provided any financing to the project, it may consider
allegations of corrupt behaviors and sanction offending corporations.
This system offers several advantages. Both the new and old
procedures allow for notice, hearing, and opportunity to be heard,
123. World Bank, Sanctions Committee, http://go.worldbank.org/BJ9P6TARY1 (last
visited Mar. 10, 2010).
124. REPORT CONCERNING THE DEBARMENT PROCESSES OF THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/BJ9P6TARY1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
125. World Bank, Sanctions Committee, supra note 123.
126. WORLD BANK, SANCTIONS PROCEDURES (2010),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/SanctionsProcedures_9 15
2010.pdf. Under the system in place between 1998 and 2007, the committee was made up of
World Bank staff members appointed by the World Bank President. The Department of
Institutional Integrity investigated allegations of fraud and, if warranted, referred the case to
the Sanctions Committee. The Sanctions Committee reviewed the evidence, notified the
Respondent, received its written submissions, and held a hearing. If evidence of corruption
was sufficient, the Committee recommended reprimand, debarment, or other sanctions to the
World Bank President, who had final authorization. See generally WORLD BANK, REFORM OF
THE WORLD BANK'S SANCTIONS PROCESS, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/06/29/000160016
20040629112806/Rendered/PDF/295270rev.pdf.
127. WORLD BANK, SANCTIONS PROCEDURES, supra note 126, § 1.01(b).
128. Id. § 3.01(b).
129. Id. § 4.01(a).
130. Id. § 5.01(a).
131. ld.§9 9.03.
132. Id. §§ 2.01, 4.02.
133. See id. § 1.01(c).
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mirroring the rights afforded to defendants in U.S. criminal court. These
safeguards legitimize the process and serve a practical purpose. As
Thornburgh noted in his report, "[an inaccurate or unjust determination
can be costly" to the debarred firm or consultant as well as the Bank
itself.1 34 Debarment may "eliminat[e] from future contention one of the
very few firms" with the expertise or size required for complex
development projects that the bank considers important.135  All
corporations or consultants alleged to have engaged in corrupt practices
will be brought before the same Board and subject to the same procedures,
which enables corporations to develop expectations about the sanctions
that corrupt behavior will incur. Additionally, due to the specialized
nature of the sanctions proceedings, Evaluation Officers and Board
members will be able to develop expertise in the area. While this initially
creates a steep learning curve and may require the offices to dedicate
substantial amounts of time to developing this expertise,136 it may prove to
be an asset for the Board in future investigations. The World Bank's
decision to include external, independent legal experts on the Board in
addition to World Bank officers will assist expertise development. The
resources available to the INT, the Evaluation Officer, and the Sanctions
Board buoy the process's legitimacy. These resources include financial
assets and access to the records and data that firms may be contractually
obligated to reveal.137
The sanctioning process also enables the World Bank to mete out
punishments that sufficiently deter corruption. While domestic
jurisdictions may be bound by sentencing or fine restrictions, the Sanctions
Board has far more flexibility in determining the appropriate sanction. In
the case of Lesotho, the fines were paltry in comparison to the contracts that
the guilty companies won on the Lesotho project; this punishment is
unlikely to deter future corrupt behavior. Sanctions, on the other hand, bar
corporations or consultants from winning bids for work on any project that
receives financing, however limited, from the World Bank. These losses
come in the form of future earnings, but they may nevertheless be sufficient
to deter corruption. The losses are compounded by the cross-debarment
agreement reached in 2010 by the World Bank and four regional
development banks. Under this agreement, if one of the banks debars a
corporation for more than one year for having engaged in corrupt practices,
the other four banks will debar the company as well.138
134. WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 6.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 21-22.
137. PROCUREMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 21, art. 1.14(e).
138. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAus DERINGER US LLP, Sanctions Investigations by the World Bank
and Other Multilateral Development Banks 1-2 (Uuly 2010), available at
www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2010/JulyO/28402.pdf; Cross-Debartnent Accord
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Sanctions are an administrative remedy and the World Bank is not a
criminal court, which can be beneficial to its efforts to hold corporations
accountable. The World Bank's ability to claim 'jurisdiction' over any
project to which it provides even minimal funding gives it enormous
flexibility in its investigative and sanctioning capacity. The World Bank
funded more than 190 projects in 2010 in most regions of the world, 139 and
can investigate and sanction any firm contracted to those projects. The
Sanctions Board is not limited by non-retroactivity rules or statutes of
limitations. It may investigate corruption allegations regarding completed
projects and contracts signed before the debarment process began - though
it is not obligated to do so.
The sanctions process now authorizes the Evaluation Officer to
temporarily suspend firms while investigations into alleged corrupt
practices are ongoing, rendering them ineligible to win new bank contracts
or participate in new activities on continuing projects.140 This closes a
loophole in the World Bank's original sanctions process, which enabled
Lahmeyer and other subsequently sanctioned firms to receive lucrative
World Bank-funded projects while they were under investigation.141 Most
recently, China Road and Bridge, a Chinese state-owned firm that was
debarred for eight years by the Sanctions Board, won $318 million in Bank-
funded contracts between 2006 and 2008, while a corruption investigation
was underway.142  The loophole allowed these and other debarred
corporations to work on long-term Bank projects during their periods of
debarment because they signed the contract before being sanctioned.
Closing it has strengthened debarment as a deterrent and punishment
mechanism.
Flaws accompany the system's strengths, however. First, although the
World Bank considered Thornburgh's criticisms when reconstituting the
Sanctions Board, several of his concerns remain valid. He noted that the
sanctioning process quickly became "in essence an adjudicatory exercise,
rather than an exercise of business discretion, with serious repercussions
for respondent firms and for the Bank."143 The new Sanctions Board
attempted to eliminate concerns about the Board's ability to handle
adjudicatory responsibilities by expanding Board membership to include
external legal experts and changing the process by which sanctions were
granted. While these changes strengthened the Board's adjudicatory
purpose, they have not necessarily dampened its business purpose. The
World Bank ultimately is an economic organization; as discussed in Part I,
its bottom-line focus may overshadow anti-corruption goals. If the World
Bank believes that a corporation will be essential to a planned project's
139. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2010 front cover (2010). The IDA
funded 190 new projects in 2010, and the IBRD funded 164 new projects.
140. WORLD BANK, SANCHONS PROCEDURE.S, supra note 126, § 2.01 (2010).
141. Horta, supra note 12, at 17-18; Pottinger, supra note 13.
142. Editorial, World Bank Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2009, at A10.
143. WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 21-22.
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success, it may be hesitant to sanction it. It is not clear if the Sanctions
Board will honor its anti-corruption commitment over the Bank's economic
development agenda; the Bank in the past has favored the latter over the
former.144
The system is still vulnerable to real or perceived conflicts of interest.145
Although it has some external members, several members of the Board are
still current World Bank staffers with managerial and professional positions
that may cause conflicts of interest.146  In addition, the World Bank
maintains close ties with several MNCs. For example, The Corner House
reported that Lahmeyer staff members participated in the World Bank's
Staff Exchange Programme, which "allow[ed] them an insider's view of
how the Bank works, as well as allowing them to get to know Bank staff
personally.. . ."147 These relationships may call into question the neutrality
of any investigations into these same companies. Individuals who have
experienced the consequences of corruption - tax-payers or affected
communities, for example - do not have a right to be heard in the hearings,
and the Sanctions Board's decision to close a case is not subject to objection.
As a result, there are few safeguards against incomplete or falsely closed
investigations.
Although evidence of corrupt behaviors may emerge from audits and
project reviews, the World Bank largely focuses on early project reviews
related to determinations of project legitimacy. Once loans have been
released to the borrower, the World Bank rarely engages in subsequent
reviews or audits, "allowing all sorts of procurement wrongdoing to go
undetected." 148 Third parties may bring allegations to trigger the sanctions
process, but they may not have access to the information they need to
proffer a credible claim. Therefore, the sanctions policy may not
consistently identify corruption. In addition, the World Bank's
investigators are not criminal investigators. They "do not possess the
traditional powers of investigators in a national police agency - including,
at least after court approval, the power to compel testimony and compel the
production of documentary evidence." 149 Even their ability to access the
records of a respondent firm may be contingent on the World Bank having
included such a clause in the initial contract.150 This limits the World
Bank's ability to gather sufficient evidence of corruption.
144. See supra Part I.A.
145. WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 23-24.
146. Id.
147. THE CORNER HOUSE, supra note 106, at 3.
148. AGUILAK ET AL., supra note 15, at 15.
149. Id. at 17.
150. PROcUREMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 1.14(e); CONSULTANT GUIDELINES, supra
note 21, § 1.22(e).
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B. Domestic Law
Due to the fact that a wide range of legal and political systems are in
place in different developing countries, it is difficult to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of investigation, prosecution, and punishment in
domestic courts. This section will therefore examine the strengths and
weaknesses of an effective process, using Lesotho's LHWP corruption trials
as a case study, and will acknowledge the practical reality that many
countries lack either the political will or capability to thoroughly investigate
and prosecute corporations for corrupt practices.
Domestic methods of investigating and punishing corruption have
some benefits. First, when a borrower country sues or prosecutes corrupt
contracting corporations, it is able to recoup financial losses that it suffered
because of the corrupt transactions,151 or avoid future losses to
corruption.152 Remedies are not the only comparative strength of this
process. Because the investigators are government employees with the
right to access information and conduct interviews in the state, they can
gather information available only on the ground and share information
between government agencies and the courts. This increases the
effectiveness and decreases the cost of investigations. In Lesotho, for
example, when the government uncovered initial wrongdoing via an audit,
it utilized the information in an administrative proceeding and then shared
the information with criminal prosecutors, who used the information to
prosecute the bribe-receiving official and the bribe-giving corporations.
Thus, the initial project audit and subsequent administrative investigation
laid the groundwork for the criminal case against Sole. 53 The investigation
into Sole also provided the initial evidence of corruption by the
corporations;154 a single investigation uncovered information about
multiple corrupt actors. Finally, the borrower country may investigate
charges relating to infrastructure not funded by the Bank.' 55
Corruption prosecutions also benefit the borrower country's broad anti-
corruption and development agendas. A well-organized, objective process
legitimizes the judiciary and regulatory agencies in the eyes of the public,
151. This funding goes directly to the government, and the government is not required to
feed the funds back to affected communities.
152. See, e.g., Augustine Nwabuzor, Corruption and Development: New Initiatives in Economic
Openness and Strengthened Rule of Law, 59 J. Bus. ETHICS 121, 131 (2005) (Nigeria has saved half
a billion dollars by targeting "bloated contracts" and blacklisting foreign suppliers that
overcharge the state).
153. See supra Part II.B.
154. Id.
155. Corruption cases stemming from non-Bank projects may affect Bank-funded projects.
Corrupt government officials may be involved in both types of projects, so investigating
corruption on any project may uncover corruption on Bank-funded projects. Corporations
may be less likely to engage in corrupt practices if the courts have demonstrated a willingness
to prosecute. In addition, any corruption case will build expertise and institutional knowledge
about combating corruption in infrastructure development.
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which can be important for emerging democracies and judiciaries
attempting to establish themselves as legitimate and independent. 156 It
indicates "the existence of the rule of law," which in turn is an important
component of economic development. 157 An objective adjudicatory process
signals to the public that the government is capable of investigating and
trying corrupt actors, despite their station in the government itself (in the
case of the government officials) or their wealth, influence, and relationship
with developed nation allies (in the case of the corporations). It also signals
to corporations that they may be prosecuted for corrupt practices, which
may deter corrupt behavior.
There are several disadvantages to the domestic intervention approach,
however. Laws, including statutes of limitation and fine limits, may block
the state from handing down punishments commensurate with the crime.
Fines that would be prohibitive for domestic firms may not deter MNCs
that conduct business in strong currencies and win lucrative contracts
worth more than the potential fine. Domestic courts may also face
jurisdictional limitations. The Lesotho prosecution relied heavily on
information gleaned from Sole's bank account in Switzerland.158 Had
Switzerland not granted prosecutors access to this information, Lesotho
would have had no authority to demand it. Jurisdiction also may limit the
prosecuting country's ability to enforce payment of a fine that has been
handed down. In Lesotho, several corporations have not yet paid their
fines. 159
The prosecuting country must have the capability, the actual and
perceived legitimacy, and the political will to try corruption cases. Trials
are costly, and many developing countries have finite resources to allocate
to the judiciary. Lesotho attempted to secure funding or technical
assistance from donor countries, but despite the international community's
vocal support for Lesotho's LHWP trials and several countries' promises to
provide financial assistance, Lesotho ultimately received little funding and
had to carry the costs itself.160 Although fines offset some of these costs,
fines used to fund the trials are no longer available to make up the losses
from the original corruption. The expected costs may prevent a country
from initiating thorough investigations in the first place. Many developing
judiciaries also are undergoing periods of reform to increase judicial
156. J. MARK PAYNE ET AL., DEMOCRACIES IN DEVELOPMENT: POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA
222 (Inter-American Dev. Bank 2007); Sara C. Benesh, Understanding Public Confidence in
American Courts, 68 J. POL. 697, 699, 703 (2006) ("support for courts comes . . . from perceptions
of the fairness of procedures employed there"); Jost Delbruck, Exercising Public Authority
Beyond the State: Transnational Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (2003) (transparency, efficiency, and accountability contribute to
"the legitimacy of the exercise of public authority").
[57. Nwabuzor, supra note 152, at 128, 126-28.
158. Wanlin, supra note 99, at 224.
159. Id. at 228.
160. Id. at 228, 237.
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independence and professionalism. 161 Corporate corruption cases may help
a judiciary or related investigative agencies build expertise, but they also
may be difficult for reforming judiciaries to tackle.
The judiciary also must have real and perceived legitimacy. At stake is
the judiciary's interest and ability to be objective in making determinations
about a corporation or government official's culpability. It is also
important that the World Bank, multilateral donors, and the international
community perceive the process to be a legitimate one; if there is concern
regarding the investigation methods, the government's motives, or the
judiciary's independence, donors may not support the borrower's attempts
to root out corruption and may balk at future loans and investments.
Selective prosecutions also may give rise to questions about objectivity. A
judiciary that is vulnerable to influence due to its structure or relationship
with political figures may call into question even those trials that have not
been improperly influenced. Real or perceived illegitimacy strengthens the
claims of impropriety by accused corporations and their home states, even
if the corruption allegations are valid.
Some countries also may not have the political will to tackle corruption
cases. Infrastructure development projects are vulnerable to grand
corruption by high-level government officials,162 who likely would not
support audits and investigations. The judiciary, prosecutors, and other
government agencies may be vulnerable to influence and corruption. 63
Governments may also use anti-corruption efforts as a faqade to prosecute
corporations and officials selectively or falsely in order to achieve other
political goals, such as punishing government officials of opposition parties
or pressuring corporations. This raises the classic "boy who cried wolf"
problem; in a system in which the judiciary is used for political or corrupt
ends, the country's population and the international community will not
trust the actions of a corrupt judiciary, even when the acts - a corruption
prosecution, for example - are meritorious.
The borrower state's willingness to try corporations for infrastructure
development project corruption may also be influenced by the
development project's financiers. 165 MNCs contracted to work on the
161. See Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues,
14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 118-19 (1999).
162. See Kenny, supra note 29, at 5-6; Claes Sandgren, Combating Corruption: The
Misunderstood Role of Law, 39 INT'L LAW. 717, 723 (2005); Tanzi & Davoodi, supra note 29, at 42.
163. See Edgardo Buscaglia, Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and
Economic Consequences 8 (Stanford Univ. Hoover Inst. Working Paper No. 95, 1999) ("specific
organizational structures and behavioral patterns within the courts in developing countries
make them prone to . .. systemic corrupt practices").
164. See Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical
Process in Judicial Reform, 18 Wis. INT'L L.J. 353, 358-59 (2000); see also WORLD BANK, THE WORLD
BANK'S ANTI-CORRUFTION GUIDELINES AND SANcTIONS REFORM: A USER'S GUIDE 2 (2007),
available at http:/ /siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/ Resources/40940-
1173795340221/RevisedPMNDFinaluserGuideline031607.pdf.
165. See, e.g., Sarah Bracking, The Lesotho Highlands Corruption Trial: Who Has Been
Airbrushed from the Dock?, 28 REV. AFR. POL. EcON. 302, 305 (2001) (reviewing the relationship
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project often are based in donor countries, the governments of which may
wish to avoid corruption scandals involving their companies.166 The donor
governments may be pressured by the corporations to intercede on their
behalf with the borrower state, and the borrower state may fear the loss of
future development aid and loans.
The government therefore must have the political will to carry out the
investigations and prosecution in an objective and reliable manner.
Government agencies and the judiciary must be independent and generally
free of internal corruption. Those developing countries that do possess the
requisite political will often face resource constraints. As a result, it is
unlikely that Lesotho's approach will become the norm for prosecuting
infrastructure project-related corruption in the near future. This is
particularly true if the international community is not willing to expend the
resources and political capital to assist these endeavors, and if they doubt
the legitimacy of the borrower country's anti-corruption efforts.
C. Third Party States, Multilateral Actors, and Non-Government
Organizations
Although I have limited my discussion thus far to two parties, the
borrower state and the World Bank, other actors can affect the relationship
between the primary parties and influence corruption investigations and
prosecutions.
1. Third-Party States
Third-party states may exert a negative or positive influence upon
corruption investigations stemming from infrastructure development
projects. As discussed above, donor states may negatively influence
corruption investigations by protecting their MNCs from such
investigations or withholding funding from anti-corruption efforts.167
Conversely, third-party states may have a positive influence over
corruption proceedings. A third-party state may financially or politically
support corruption proceedings, or it may opt to share relevant financial
information with the prosecuting state. Switzerland's decision to give the
Lesotho government access to Sole's banking records, for example, was
crucial to the success of the LHWP investigation.168 Finally, third-party
states that have jurisdiction over offending corporations or other actors
between the United Kingdom, Lesotho, and British firms contracted on the LHWP).
166. Countries may be particularly interested in protecting the interests of their
corporations if they have specific financial interests in the firms' overseas contracts. For
example, the British Export Credit and Guarantee Department "underwrites the export
contracts and investments of UK companies working abroad"; it therefore has a direct
incentive to support British companies that are implicated in corruption scandals. Id. at 303.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 165-166.
168. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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involved in corruption may be willing to criminalize the corrupt practices
its corporations undertake in foreign territories. For example, the United
States has passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which crininalizes the
bribery of foreign officials.169 If these laws are judiciously applied, they
may further deter corporations from engaging in corrupt practices and
assuage the concerns of a borrower country that fears losing future funding
if it prosecutes a corporation from the donor country.
2. Multilateral Actors
Several international organizations have become involved in efforts to
stem corruption, and have passed multilateral instruments aimed at
improving domestic anti-corruption laws and increasing international
cooperation. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption requires
its signatories to criminalize bribery, money laundering, and other forms of
corruption,170 and to take measures to prevent corruption and to ensure the
independence and integrity of judiciaries and relevant government
institutions.171  It also mandates international cooperation among
signatories:
States Parties shall cooperate in criminal matters in accordance with
articles 44 to 50 of this Convention. Where appropriate and
consistent with their domestic legal system, States Parties shall
consider assisting each other in investigations and proceedings in
civil and administrative matters relating to corruption.172
The Convention also requires "States Parties ... [to] afford one another
the widest measure of mutual legal assistance. . . in relation to the offences
covered by this Convention."1 73 Foreign states may be requested to execute
searches, take statements, provide bank records and other evidence, and
identify proceeds of corruption.174 The Convention also allows foreign
states to "transmit information relating to criminal matters to a competent
authority in another State Party where they believe that such information
could assist the authority in undertaking or successfully concluding
inquiries and criminal proceedings" without prior request. 175
Other international instruments, including the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating
169. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. 105-366, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (Dec. 19, 1977,
amended Nov. 10, 1998).
170. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 26, arts. 15-24.
171. Id. arts. 7, 11.
172. Id. art. 43.
173. Id. art. 46(1).
174. Id. art. 46(3).
175. Id. art. 46(4).
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Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,176
the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,177 the European Union
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,1 78 and the African Union
Convention on Combating and Preventing Corruption,179 address similar
anti-corruption efforts. If parties to these instruments implement them,
borrower countries will have stronger anti-corruption laws and better
access to the resources they need to properly investigate violations.
3. Non-Government Actors
Non-government actors - including the media, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and local civil society organizations and activists -
may also play a part in anti-corruption endeavors.180 As agenda-setters,'81
non-governmental actors focus attention on corruption as a problem,
pressure borrower governments and the World Bank to initiate
investigations into corrupt practices, and influence the agendas of other,
more powerful non-government actors. NGOs already have successfully
lobbied on the local and international level to mobilize public opinion
against dam construction.182 They can help demonstrate the link between
corrupt practices and the environmental degradation and rights abuses felt
by communities affected by these projects.183 Establishing this link will
place corruption on the agenda of powerful activists that focus primarily on
environmental and human rights issues. This in turn will increase the
pressure that non-government actors are able to place on the World Bank
and the borrower states that investigate corruption and on the third-party
states that can assist those investigations.
Non-government actors also may fulfill a "watchdog" function.184 The
informal oversight mechanisms of community organizing, political
176. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
177. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
Mar. 29,1996, O.A.S.T.S. No. B-58, 35 I.L.M. 724.
178. European Union Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27,1999, Eur. T. S. No.
173.
179. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Jul. 11, 2003.
180. Civil society at the local and international level plays an important role in demanding
accountability and transparency, information sharing, and good govemance. See Brinkerhoff,
supra note 25, at 239.
181. See generally DOUG McADAM ET AL., COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS
308-09 (1996) (introducing the media, political, and electoral agendas that non-state actors seek
to shape and frame).
182. Aart van de Laar, Water Development for Power and Irrigation, the Environment and
Sustainable Development 5 (Inst. Soc. Stud., Working Paper Series No. 141, 1993).
183. Dana Clark, Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel, in DEMANDING
ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra note
61, at 1, 2.
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lobbying, and media coverage may encourage investigative and
prosecutorial integrity and transparency.185 For a variety of reasons, non-
government actors may or may not engage in agenda-setting or watchdog
activities, or be successful at doing so.186 They may not support corruption
investigations or may favor other issues over corruption. Ultimately, their
presence, absence, and motives may inform how and if investigations
proceed. This is particularly true given the increased space for engagement
that civil society has carved out for itself in the World Bank and in many
countries.187
IV. A NEW WAY FORWARD
Large-scale infrastructure projects will continue to be an important
component in the development agenda of borrower countries and the World
Bank. I have demonstrated that these projects are vulnerable to corruption.188
Corruption decreases project effectiveness, increases price, financially burdens
a borrower country's population, and increases the risk of environmental
degradation and human rights abuses relating to the project.189 Preventative
programs are necessary but not sufficient to eradicate this problem,
particularly in the short term given corruption's prevalence and the financial
incentives of winning bids on infrastructure development projects. 190 The
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of corruption are integral parts of
the solution. The Bank's Sanctions Board and domestic prosecutions are
promising but ultimately unsatisfactory. Neither individual option is enough
185. See Pilar Domingo, Judicial Independence and Judicial Reform in Latin America, in THE
SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 151, 164
(Andreas Schedler, Larry Jay Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999) (suggesting that NGO
pressure has led to legal reforms in Latin America); see also DAVID DE FERRANTI ET AL., THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT THROUGH BETTER USE OF PUBLIC
RESOURCES: How INDEPENDENT WATCHDOG GROUPS CAN HELP (Policy Brief 157, 2006)
(arguing that NCOs, civil society, and the media can play a role in demanding budgetary
transparency).
186. See JAMES M. JASPER, THE ART OF MORAL PROTEST: CULTURE, BIOGRAPHY, AND
CREATIVITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 332 (1997); DOUG MCADAM, SIDNEY G. TARROW & CHARLES
TILLY, DYNAMICS OF CONTENTION 14-16 (2001) (introducing theories as to why social
movements form and succeed).
187. See Robert Fatton, Jr., Africa in the Age of Democratization: The Civic Limitations of Civil
Society, 38 AFR. STUD. REV. 67, 68 (1995); Jonathan Fox, Introduction to DEMANDING
ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra note
61, at xi, xiii; Jamie Elizabeth Jacobs & Martin Maldonado, Civil Society in Argentina:
Opportunities and Challenges for National and Transnational Organisation, 37 J. LAT. AM. STUD. 141,
144 (2005); Catherine Weaver & Susan Park, The Role of the World Bank in Poverty Alleviation and
Human Development in the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 461,
462-63 (2007). See generally Michael Bratton, Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa, in
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN AFRICA 51 (John W. Harbeson, Naomi Chazan & Donald
Rothchild eds., 1994).
188. See supra Part LA.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Buscaglia, supra note 163, at 12 (noting the difficulty of implementing reform
because corruption benefits tend to be short-term and reform benefits are long-term).
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to help eradicate corruption from World Bank development projects.
In this section, I propose an alternative solution, comprised of three
related elements. First, host countries and the World Bank should include in
their procurement project contracts a "trigger clause" that would require each
party to instigate an investigation into allegations of corrupt behaviors if the
other one does. Second, the "trigger clause" should mandate information
sharing between domestic and World Bank investigators. Third, the World
Bank should create a support fund to provide monetary assistance to domestic
governments for the prosecution of corruption. The three elements of the
proposed policy will make effective investigations and prosecutions more
likely. It therefore increases the risk of engaging in corrupt practices to
procure development project contracts, such that the risks outweigh the
benefits. After I review the details and goals of the proposed policy, I consider
challenges that would face the policy but ultimately conclude that it still
represents a more effective means for combating corruption than the present
systems of investigation and punishment.
A. Provisions of the New System
The first element of the proposed system requires the World Bank and
each borrower country to include a "trigger clause" in their mandates or
contracts. The parties' individual investigation and punishment processes
will remain mutually exclusive and each party will retain independent
power over its own process. The trigger clause will pertain only to
corruption investigations into Bank-funded infrastructure projects located
in the borrower country. The clause will stipulate that when one actor has
initiated a formal investigation into allegations of corruption and can certify
that the investigation has revealed compelling evidence of corruption, the
other actor must initiate its own formal investigation into the corrupt
behaviors. Language accompanying the clause will confirm both parties'
commitment to objective, rigorously conducted investigations and fairly
decided outcomes, and will require that the investigations focus both on
bribe-receiving officials and bribe-giving corporations.
The Sanctions Board will include the trigger clause as part of its official
World Bank mandate. Borrower countries can pass legislation about the
trigger clause, or they can opt to write the clause into each Bank-funded
project's Terms of Reference (TOR) or in their loan agreements. Although
the outcomes of each investigation need not mirror one another, any
conflict between the final findings will act as a second trigger for the World
Bank Sanctions Board, requiring it to review investigations whose outcome
differ substantially from the borrower country's outcome. The World
Bank's outcome will trigger a second investigation by the borrower state as
well, unless issues of double jeopardy or resource limitations prevent it.
The trigger clause formalizes the steps taken in the LHWP scandal: the
World Bank initiated inadequate investigations into Acres International and
Lahmeyer when Lesotho convicted the LHDA's Chief Executive Officer of
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corruption and announced its plans to prosecute Acres, Lahmeyer, and
other firms. The World Bank later reopened the investigations in response
to the guilty verdicts handed down against the MNCs, in part due to
negative political, media, and NGO pressure. The clause, however, would
trigger a World Bank investigation automatically and would not be
dependent on sufficient public outcry.
The clause also would require the borrower country to respond to a
World Bank investigation into Bank-funded project corruption by initiating
its own investigation. The borrower will have enormous flexibility to
determine the appropriate scope of the investigation and the correct venue
for post-investigation stages.191  The language of the Procurement
Guidelines may also enable the government to bring contractual breach
suits against corrupt contractors. 192
Investigations and subsequent administrative, criminal, or civil
proceedings are time consuming. Firms have taken advantage of this by
winning additional contracts after credible evidence of corruption has
emerged, but before they are sanctioned. The trigger clause will disallow
this, a step already taken by the World Bank Sanctions Board. Currently,
the Sanctions Board may temporarily suspend firms - block them from
receiving any World Bank contract - if the World Bank INT recommends a
suspension and if the Executive Officer agrees that the evidence justifies
such a suspension while the formal investigation or hearing is ongoing.193
I propose that a borrower country also temporarily bar firms under
investigation from receiving new contracts on publicly funded projects in
that country. Suspensions should trigger when one party certifies that
there is credible evidence that the corporation engaged in corrupt
practices.194 Exceptions should be authorized if it can be shown both that
the contract requires specialization or expertise that the corporation in
question is able to perform better than other bidders, and that the award
was made based upon a fair and transparent bidding process. The contract
should be made contingent upon the corporation being cleared of
wrongdoing.
The efficacy of the trigger clause depends on the two other elements of
my proposal: information sharing and a support fund. These elements
191. The borrower country may pursue administrative sanctions, criminal prosecutions, or
a civil case to recoup financial losses.
192. The Procurement Guidelines allow a borrower country to contractually require
bidding firms to "observe . . . the country's laws against fraud and corruption." PROCUREMENT
GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 1.15; see also CONSULTANT GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 1.23
(providing a similar rule regarding the observation of the country's domestic laws). A
contractor that signs the bidding agreement and then engages in corruption may be in breach.
193. WORLD BANK, SANCTIONS PROCEDURES, supra note 126, §§ 2.01,4.02.
194. This does not implicate due process or presumption of innocence. The Sanctions
Board is not a court of law. Due process in international or domestic law would not afford a
corporation the right to future contracts. It is valid for a borrower to consider whether a
corporation has been implicated in previous corruption incidents. See World Bank
Responsibility, supra note 142.
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ensure that the trigger clause is maximally effective by equipping both
parties with the tools to properly investigate corruption charges.
Mandatory information sharing (with limited rights of non-disclosure for
sensitive or legally confidential materials) between the World Bank and
domestic investigators will enable both parties to conduct thorough
investigations, given that both parties are limited in their ability to collect
information. The Sanctions Committee currently cannot access government
records or interview people in the borrower country. Borrower
government investigators often lack the resources or legal power to access
corporate records, foreign financial records, or other evidence outside its
borders. Each party needs access to all relevant information, although each
set of investigators should independently evaluate this information. The
investigations themselves must remain independent to avoid - in
appearance or reality - the possibility of one party inappropriately
influencing the outcome of the other party's investigation.
The third element of the proposed policy requires the World Bank to
develop a fund specifically to help developing countries prosecute
corruption cases stemming from Bank-funded infrastructure development
projects. Disbursement of funds may be at the discretion of the Sanctions
Board, based upon the level of judicial reform in the country, and
contingent upon the transparency and legitimacy of the proceedings. These
requirements will allow the World Bank to prevent its funds from being
used to further prosecutorial misconduct or politically motivated
indictments while giving the borrower state access to the resources it needs
to exact proper penalties for corruption.195
The proposed policy will expand the influence of non-government
actors and, in turn, be assisted by these actors. With the trigger clause in
place, non-government actors will be able to pressure either the borrower
government or the World Bank and affect the agendas of both. Actors may
at times have more or less influence over one of these parties. "Influencing
an institution like the World Bank is not a short-term, low-investment
process. Making a difference requires a sustained, cohesive coalition
capable of mobilizing and analyzing information relevant to Bank activities,
making that information available to key actors, and mobilizing many
sources of influence."1 96 Actors without the resources to influence the
World Bank may have better access to their local governments,197
particularly because the democratization of developing countries means
that their governments have to answer to affected communities, activists,
195. Huther & Shah, supra note 49, at 4.
196. L. David Brown & Jonathan Fox, Transnational Civil Society Coalitions and the World
Bank: Lessons from Project and Policy Influence Campaigns, 16 IDR REPORTS 1, 2 (2000).
197. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown, Introduction to THE STRUGGLE FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRAssROOTs MOVEMENTS 1, 2 (Jonathan A.
Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998) (noting that NGOs have "pressur [edj donor governments to
encourage the World Bank to adopt more rigorous environmental and social policies" rather
than going directly through the World Bank).
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and organizations. 198 Alternately, non-government actors can turn to the
World Bank when they lack influence over their own government. Under
the proposed policies, either avenue will trigger investigations by both
government and Bank.
The proposed policies also will give developing countries increased
influence over the World Bank's sanctioning process. Borrower countries
cannot dictate Sanctions Board outcomes, but they can prompt Bank
investigations and provide incentive for the Bank to investigate properly.
The developing countries then may benefit from the resources and findings
of the World Bank. In circumstances where the national government is the
reluctant party, the multilateral bank can propel investigations. Neither
party need be the tail trying to wag the dog; both would have the ability to
spur the other to tackle corruption cases.
Ultimately, in the wake of the Lesotho scandal - and the negative
media and NGO attention that the World Bank received for its initial failed
investigation - the proposed policy and trigger clause may result in a 'race
to the top' between the World Bank and the host countries. The
information-sharing provision of the proposed policy will ensure that
resource deficits will not thwart any party's investigation. A poorly
executed investigation by one party will be apparent when compared to the
other. This will encourage the state and the World Bank to conduct the
thorough investigations that ultimately must occur if the proposed policy is
to succeed at stopping corruption on Bank-funded infrastructure projects.
B. Goals of the Proposed Provisions
The World Bank and borrower countries should have two goals with
relation to their infrastructure projects: to eradicate project-related
corruption, and to improve the cost efficiency, construction soundness, and
environmental and human rights standards of infrastructure projects so
that the benefits outweigh the costs to developing countries and affected
communities. The proposed policy can play a substantive role in achieving
these goals by improving investigation and punishment methods.
The proposed policy will create disincentives for corruption on Bank-
funded projects by increasing the risk for bidding corporations of being
caught and punished and by changing the cost-benefit analysis of corrupt
behavior such that corruption is no longer a financially sound choice. Non-
government actors seeking accountability will be able to concentrate
lobbying efforts on either the World Bank or borrower country and trigger
investigations by both. The information-sharing provision and assistance
funds will improve the quality of the investigations. If a borrower country
198. See Larry J. Diamond & Leonardo Morlino, The Quality of Democracy: An Overview, 15
J. OF DEMOCRACY 20, 21, 23-25 (2004) (having a strong democracy means that citizens have the
freedom to "articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests," access
multiple forms of information, and hold leaders accountable).
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and relevant third parties are signatories to the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption or other anti-corruption instruments, the borrower
country may access evidence housed in foreign banks and corporate
headquarters, further improving investigation effectiveness and possibly
prompting additional trials in the corporation's home country.
The proposed policy also will improve infrastructure development
projects. Successful prosecutions will strip corrupt corporations of bidding
privileges and remove bribe-receiving officials from their offices, and may
help the borrower country recoup corruption-related losses. The policy
makes corrupt behavior riskier for corporations and officials and increases
the likelihood of corruption-free bidding. Transparent, legitimate bidding
processes will ensure that the best corporations will be contracted on
projects, in part because they make corporations and officials more
accountable to external investigative bodies and less likely to cut corners or
ignore construction, environmental, or human rights standards. The
proposed policy will therefore decrease corruption on World Bank-funded
infrastructure projects and improve the infrastructure projects themselves.
C. Early Steps in the Current System
The proposed policy adheres closely to commitments already affirmed
by the World Bank and in instruments such as the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption. The provisions of the current system
suggest that the elements of the proposed policy would be feasible
additions. For instance, Sanction Board decisions are already disseminated
to the borrowing country and the firm's home country and released
publicly.199 The Bank currently also has broad discretion to share non-
sensitive evidence submitted to the Sanctions Board with other multilateral
development banks, international or multinational organizations, national
development agencies, and investigating or prosecuting authorities of
member countries, if it determines that doing so is in the best interests of
the Bank and if the receiving party agrees to confidentiality terms
acceptable to the Bank.200 The World Bank Sanctions Procedures further
confirm that nothing - including the sensitive materials restrictions - limits
the Bank's ability to share investigative materials with parties "if such
information sharing is permitted by its policies and procedures." 201 My
proposed information-sharing provision would expand rather than
reinvent the existing disclosure regulations. The new provisions would
make disclosing non-sensitive information mandatory rather than
discretionary. It also would enable the Sanctions Board to disclose
information to criminal investigators and to receive information in return.
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Second, the World Bank already funds judicial reform efforts; 202 the
proposed provision asks only that the Bank direct some of these resources
specifically toward corruption investigations and prosecutions stemming
from Bank-funded projects. Third, the World Bank Evaluation Officer
currently has the authority to bar corporations found guilty of corrupt
behaviors and temporarily suspend corporations while the investigation is
pending. 203 My proposal would expand this power to apply also to a
borrower state. Finally and most practically, the LHWP scandal
exemplifies the realistic interaction between the two systems; transparent,
legitimate domestic investigations can influence the World Bank. The
proposed provisions only formalize this process.
D. Challenges Facing the Proposed Regime
In this section, I review the challenges facing the proposed policy. First,
the proposed provisions likely will not immediately eradicate corruption
on large-scale infrastructure projects. There are several procedural
complications involved in amending the Sanctions Board bylaws, TOR
Agreements, and contracts between World Bank and borrower countries
and between the borrower countries and corporations. It may take time to
accrue a sustainable source of funding in the World Bank to support
domestic prosecutions. In order to put these changes into motion, the
World Bank will have to hold multilateral and bilateral talks with donor
and borrower countries in order to coordinate implementation and
determine appropriate rules for investigative cooperation. Putting aside
these procedural issues, there remain three major concerns that may limit
support and affect how successful the proposed changes ultimately are in
achieving their stated goals.
1. Legitimacy
The first concern is that the investigation itself may be susceptible to
corruption or inappropriate influence. Corporations and foreign countries
may bribe or inappropriately influence government officials in charge of
initial administrative investigations. A borrower country may use
corruption investigations to make a political statement against a
corporation's home country, to extract kickbacks, as a bargaining chip in
other negotiations with the corporation or its home country, or to achieve
other financial or political ends. Many borrower countries struggle with
institutional corruption, and critics of the proposed policy may argue that
the Bank's investigation agenda should not be dictated by countries
202. See WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM (2002), available at
http:/ /siteresources.worldbank.or g/ BRAZILINPOREXTN/ Resources/3817166-
1185895645304/4044168-1186409169154/18initiativesFinal.pdf.
203. WORLD BANK, SANCTIONS PROCEDURES, supra note 126, §§ 2.01, 4.02, 9.01.
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plagued by internal corruption. Finally, the World Bank or a borrower
government may face pressure from donors or may act out of fear of
imagined donor disapproval, resulting in selective investigations.
The perception of illegitimacy may be just as destructive to my
proposed system. If borrower countries do not trust the legitimacy of
World Bank investigations or vice versa, cooperation and mutual respect of
process and outcomes will be unlikely. If third-party states do not trust the
legitimacy of either system, they will not cooperate under the terms of the
multilateral anti-corruption instruments or as donors. They also may
support their MNCs in corruption cases against what they perceive to be
spurious accusations.
While these are valid concerns, I argue that they are less of a concern in
my proposed system than they are under the current system. First, false
prosecutions against innocent parties will be less likely under the dual
system that I propose. The first investigating party will be less likely to
pursue improper prosecutions if it knows that a second investigation by an
independent party will follow, as the second investigation will reveal
improprieties of the first. Indeed, each investigation will act as a check on
the other one. A second investigation will not be triggered until
investigators can show that a certain threshold of evidence has been met,
which will prevent corporations or officials from having to endure more
than one investigation into false accusations of corruption. This system also
will curtail false negatives - incidents of corruption that are not
investigated or prosecuted.
2. Political Will
Anti-corruption endeavors will not evolve beyond rhetoric unless
political actors have the "demonstrated credible intent . . . to attack
perceived causes or effects of corruption."204 This system hinges on the
political will of the actors. Either the World Bank or a borrower country
must initially choose to investigate corruption on infrastructure projects,
and be willing to prioritize this agenda over other, conflicting goals,
including project completion and future funding. Donor states, particularly
a MNC's home state, must be willing to prioritize the anti-corruption
agenda over the welfare of their MNCs and to maintain aid pledges to the
World Bank or the borrower country. Non-government actors will have to
prioritize corruption with or above other concerns, including the
environment, resettlement, and human rights issues.
As evidenced by the Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project, corruption will go
unpunished despite public availability of evidence when the parties lack
incentive or capacity to combat corrupt practices. Corruption is an
entrenched problem, and it has been a characteristic of many large-scale
204. Sahr J. Kpundeh, Political Will in Fighting Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY
IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 91, 92 (Irene Hora ed., 1998).
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infrastructure projects; 205 there traditionally has been little political will to
challenge this system. However, the anti-corruption agenda has gained
traction in recent decades, and the World Bank's willingness to reconstitute
its sanctions process illustrates its increased willingness to improve its
administrative methods of investigation and prosecution. The Bank also
has shown a willingness to examine its infrastructure projects with a more
critical eye toward efficiency, corruption, the environment, and human
costs.
My proposed policy will not create political will, but it will change the
current prosecution mechanisms so that less political will is required to
achieve more and improved investigations, prosecutions, and punishments
as compared with the current system. If the proposed policy is
implemented, only one actor needs to have the political will to engage with
corruption on a Bank-funded project in order to trigger investigations from
both the World Bank and the borrower. In addition, the policy will
dismantle several financial and political capital costs of investigations.
Once there is enough political will to move forward, I argue that my policy
creates a more effective means of investigation and prosecution than the
means currently available to the strong willed.
3. Sovereignty
The proposed policy also implicates the sovereignty of the countries
involved. It gives the World Bank the authority to require states to initiate
investigations, which involves policymaking and judicial discretion,
powers traditionally asserted by the nation-state. In addition, for those
projects that are jointly owned by more than one country, like the LHWP
and the YacyretAi Hydroelectric Project, either country effectively would be
empowered to dictate the executive or judicial decisions of its co-owner
state. One country could investigate allegations of corruption, triggering a
World Bank inquiry, which then would trigger an investigation by the co-
owning country.
Neither problem is insurmountable. Countries may voluntarily cede
sovereign rights over lawmaking or judicial decision-making to
intergovernmental bodies; several international treaties require such
agreements. 206 For example, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspect of
International Child Abduction includes articles requiring a signatory
country take action in response to submissions of child abduction by other
205. Masood Ahmed, Votes and Voice: Reforming Governance at the World Bank, in RESCUING
THE WORLD BANK: A CGD WORKING GROUP REPORT & SELECTED ESSAYS 87, 99 (Nancy Birdsall
ed., 2006).
206. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Civil Aspect of International Child Abduction, S.
Treaty Doc. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1980) reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1981), arts. 2, 7
(requiring that signatory states cooperate with other signatory nations and take measures to
prevent the wrongful removal or secure the return of children); U.N. Convention Against
Corruption, supra note 26 (requiring signatory states to implement anti-corruption policies).
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countries,207 which suggests that countries may be willing to enter into
trigger agreements.
The issue of sovereignty is fraught. The Convention Against
Corruption expressly states that its provisions, which require that signatory
nations enact domestic anti-corruption policies and engage in cross-border
cooperation, respect the internationally recognized principle of "non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of other States." 208 The proposed
trigger policy will not dictate specific policies, however. It requires only
that investigative steps be taken, which aligns with the type of
requirements encompassed in multilateral conventions.209 Moreover, states
are free to enter into contractual obligations with other states. Should the
World Bank opt to incorporate these policies into its contracts, sovereignty
becomes even less of a concern because states will be able to decide, on a
case by case basis, whether they wish to contract with the World Bank,
given the trigger policy.
4. World Bank Future Relevance
The proposed policy will punish ongoing corruption, deter future
corruption on Bank-funded infrastructure projects, and improve the
sustainability and effectiveness of these projects. Although the policy will
have spill-over effects, its primary goals, like the analysis of this paper, are
limited to projects funded by the World Bank. The "global economy and
... the relative power and needs of [the World Bank's] shareholders" have
changed dramatically since the Bank's inception.210 Private lending has
increased, as has lending from other multinational, regional, and bilateral
development banks.211 "[T]he Bank is providing a reducing proportion of
official funds, and a very small proportion of the developing world's
investment. Only in Africa ... does official aid still play an important part,
exceeding the amount of private finance."212
Despite these changes, I argue that the World Bank remains relevant in
the field of infrastructure development, and that it is still important to
tackle corruption on Bank-funded projects. The Bank still doles out huge
amounts of development funding to large-scale infrastructure projects. It
has a responsibility to its donors to be fiscally responsible with this
207. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspect of International Child Abduction, supra note
206, arts. 8-10.
208. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 26, art. 4.
209. See, e.g., The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspect of International Child Abduction,
supra note 206; U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 26.
210. Nancy Birdsall & Devesh Kapur, Center for Global Development Working Group, The
Hardest Job in the World: Five Crucial Tasks for the New President of the World Bank, in RESCUING
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 205, at 13,13.
211. Devesh Kapur, The Changing Anatomy of Governance of the World Bank, in REINVENTING
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2, at 54, 71.




Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 14 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol14/iss1/6
Going from Bad to Good
funding, and a responsibility to borrower countries to support projects that
will benefit and not burden that country's population. This responsibility is
not mitigated by the existence of other donor agencies or private financiers.
The World Bank remains a leader of development lending. Its support
of infrastructure projects signals to other lenders that the projects are credit-
worthy,213 which allows the World Bank to spread its money further. It can
fund small parts of many projects that are then capable of raising the
additional necessary funds. This system will also help the World Bank play
an important role in corruption investigations and prosecutions. The Bank
has jurisdiction over any project to which it has contributed funds, 214
thereby giving it oversight of many projects that have different primary
donors.
Moreover, in April 2010, the World Bank signed a cross-debarment
agreement with the African Development Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the
Inter-American Development Bank Group.215 Under the agreement, each
bank is able to debar a corporation that has been sanctioned by another
participating bank. These corporations will no longer be able to obtain
contracts on projects financed by any of the five banks. 216 This further
extends the World Bank's reach, and makes it more difficult for unwilling
states to simply seek loans from other multilateral lending institutions.
The issue of political will again emerges. If a borrower country does
not wish to abide by World Bank regulations or be subject to the Bank's
anti-corruption provisions, it likely will be able to attract different funding
- though it may be more difficult to do so. The World Bank's comparative
advantage is not its cash, but rather its oversight mechanism and interest in
supporting successful projects. Mark Stoleson has argued that "efforts to
improve the Bank's competitive advantage must start with the creation of
independent governance mechanisms and objective measures of success
213. Scholars continue to debate whether World Bank loans catalyze private investment in
a country. See Graham Bird, Antonella Mori & Dane Rowlands, Do the Multilaterals Catalyse
Other Capital Flows? A Case Study Analysis, 21 THIRD WORLD Q. 483 (2000). However,
anecdotal evidence suggests that World Bank investment in a specific project may encourage
private investment in that project. For example, Chad-Cameroon pipeline investors
conditioned their investment on the World Bank's involvement. Genoveva HernAndez Uriz,
The Application of the World Bank Standards to the Oil Industry: Can the World Bank Group Promote
Corporate Responsibility?, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 77, 93 (2002).
214. WORLD BANK, SANCTIONS PROCEDURES, supra note 126, § 1.01(c).
215. Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight Against Corruption, supra note 138.
216. Id. This agreement builds upon a 2006 agreement by the five participating banks, the
European Investment Bank, and the International Monetary Fund to "work towards a
consistent and harmonized approach to combat corruption in the activities and operations of
the member institutions." The member institutions agreed to harmonize their definition of
corrupt practices, exchange information, and recognize one another's enforcement actions.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE, UNIFORM
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and failure." 217  The proposed policy would provide such objective
measures and independent mechanisms.
Moreover, it is not a coincidence that Lesotho initiated an audit of the
project soon after democratizing. The country had a stake in the
accountability of the project, and the audit demonstrated the new
government's commitment to project integrity. Although democracies may
harbor corrupt institutions and officers, global anti-corruption and good-
governance agendas are gaining ground. If a borrower country has the
political will to prefer effective, non-corrupt bidding, planning, and
construction processes for large-scale infrastructure projects, the World
Bank would be well positioned in its lending agency capacity.
E. Theoretically Applying the Provisions to Yacyreta and the LHWP
Despite the similarities between the Yacyret Hydroelectric Project and
the LHWP and the overlap between the actors involved, the outcomes of
corruption allegations were vastly different. Allegations of corrupt
behaviors on Yacyreta never developed into an investigation, despite
evidence of corrupt bidding practices, cost increases that could not be fully
explained by inefficiency, and a statement from the Argentine president
that the project was corrupt. Allegations of corrupt behaviors on LHWP, by
contrast, resulted in an administrative investigation and criminal
prosecutions, and culminated with World Bank sanctions against several
MNCs. A confluence of circumstances, including Lesotho's democratic
transition, Lesotho's uncovering of additional corruption when Sole
challenged his suspension, Switzerland's banking laws, and the World
Bank's willingness to reconsider its investigation in the wake of Lesotho's
public corruption trials, set into motion the trials and World Bank
investigation that ultimately led to criminal penalties and World Bank
administrative sanctions against several powerful MNCs.
Had the proposed policy been in place, the Lesotho procedure likely
would have proceeded similarly, but more efficiently. The World Bank
may have had incentive to conduct a more thorough initial investigation in
2002, knowing that its results would be checked against the results of the
Lesotho trials. In addition, the World Bank might have had funds available
to assist Lesotho in paying the costs of the trials, and each party would
have shared information with each other.
This raises the question of whether the proposed policy would have
changed the outcome of the YacyretA Hydroelectric Project corruption
scandal. Considering only the procedural mechanisms, it would appear
that the trigger clause would not have changed the outcome. The trigger
would have remained dormant because Paraguay, Argentina, and the
World Bank all failed to investigate allegations of corrupt practices. The
217. Mark Stoleson, The World Bank: Buy, Sell, or Hold?, in RESCUING THE WORLD BANK: A
CGD WORKING GROUP REPORT AND SELEcTED ESSAYS, supra note 205, at 195, 198.
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proposed policy might otherwise have changed these parties' decision-
making processes, however. For example, the availability of funds might
have lowered the cost of investigations and prosecutions for the borrower
states. In addition, the trigger mechanism would have lowered the political
costs of initiating proceedings against government officials or corporations
because the World Bank would have borne part of these costs. By
investigating corruption, the borrower countries - or even individual
politicians within these countries - could have used the trigger clause to
transfer the burden onto the World Bank, which has the capacity to see an
investigation through to its conclusion. This might have encouraged
Paraguay or Argentina's new democracies to initiate investigations into the
dam project. Finally, non-government actors might have been more active
in pressing for corruption investigations had the proposal been in place,
because the investigations would have been more likely to be transparent
and result in prosecutions by at least one of the parties.
The proposed policy might have changed the outcome for the Yacyretai
Hydroelectric Project. More importantly, the LHWP scandal has alerted
corporations to the risk posed by dual investigations and prosecutions. By
formalizing this process and combining it with information-sharing and
funding provisions, borrower countries and the World Bank will signal to
corporations their seriousness about corruption. The process will also
signal to the Bank and borrower countries themselves that they will face
negative consequences if they do not fully investigate corruption claims,
and help develop a stronger anti-corruption culture if they do.
CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrates that corporate corruption in infrastructure
projects is a serious problem that hinders the achievement of broad anti-
corruption and development goals, and threatens the success of each specific
project. It argues that the World Bank can limit corporate corruption on
procurement projects by making three changes to its anti-corruption practices:
inserting a trigger clause into its contracts with borrower countries; ensuring
that each trigger clause also contains an information-sharing provision; and
providing financial assistance to borrower countries for the investigation and
prosecution of corporate corruption on procurement projects. The Note does
not argue that the World Bank should reconstruct its anti-corruption strategy
or shift its prioritization of development over anti-corruption concerns or its
prioritization of grand corruption prevention over corporate corruption
prosecution. Rather, it argues that the World Bank can substantially prosecute
and deter corporate corruption without shifting substantial resources away
from its current priorities, and, furthermore, that deterring corporate
corruption will actually aid its development goals. The Note posits that an
approach to investigations and punishment of corporate corruption that
combines the relative strengths of World Bank administrative proceedings
and a borrower country's administrative, civil, or criminal procedures will be
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more successful than either individual process.
My proposed strategy focuses as much on practical sustainable
development as it does on eradicating corruption. Large-scale
infrastructure projects, including hydroelectric dam projects, are often
riddled with corruption and controversy. Although they are scrutinized
and subject to criticism, their detractors grudgingly recognize their
importance and continued relevance to the development agenda:
Yet, in spite of [their] flaws, large dams remain a necessary
development option to deal with the needs of a human population
that is expanding beyond the carrying capacity of the world's life
support systems. That is the tragedy. . . . Large dams will be
needed to store and transfer water to rapidly expanding urban
populations; to provide electricity to those populations and to the
industries that must employ them if poverty is to be alleviated; to
increase irrigation in countries such as India where small
reservoirs dry up during periods of drought; and, in countries
such as Laos and Nepal with few other natural resources, to
provide foreign exchange for development purposes by exporting
hydropower. 218
A mutual triggering and assistance agreement between the World Bank
and the countries in which it invests will increase the likelihood that
allegations of corruption will instigate appropriate investigations. It will
improve the financial return of World Bank-financed projects, increase
oversight, and decrease the likelihood that corporations will engage in
corner-cutting practices that negatively affect the environment and local
communities. It also will complement the World Bank's existing anti-
corruption strategies. Currently, the LHWP scandal is viewed as an
illustration of the World Bank's failure. It should instead be viewed as a
prototype of an improved anti-corruption and development policy.
218. SCUDDER, supra note 59, at 2.
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